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A Forgotten Victory

Courcelette, 15 September 1916
David Campbell

T

he 2nd Canadian Division, which landed
in France on 15 September 1915, had
established an uncertain operational record by
the summer of 1916. As part of the Canadian
Corps, the division had spent virtually all of its
time in or near Belgium’s notorious Ypres Salient,
where it was embroiled in a grim campaign of
trench warfare. Notable successes in trench
raiding were offset by costly setbacks, such as the
division’s failure to hold a series of mine craters
at St. Eloi in April 1916. This was followed in
June by the withdrawal of one of its brigades
in the face of heavy enemy attacks at Hooge,
which were part of the Germans’ ultimately
unsuccessful effort to hold captured Canadian
positions around Mount Sorrel.
M a j o r- G e n e r a l R i c h a r d Tu r n e r, t h e
commander of 2nd Canadian Division, was
himself under a cloud. His earlier performance
as a brigade commander in 1st Canadian Division
during the 2nd Battle of Ypres in 1915 was
questionable at best, and his division’s inability
to make sense of the bewildering topography at
St. Eloi in 1916 raised serious questions about
his suitability for high command. Turner retained
command of the division largely through his
personal connections with the Canadian Minister
of Militia and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes.1

Redemption for 2nd Canadian Division,
and to some degree, for Turner himself, would
finally come with the division’s successful
storming of the French village of Courcelette
on 15 September 1916. This operation, which
was part of the larger Somme offensive, was
2nd Canadian Division’s first major victory of
the First World War. Unfortunately, the glow of
success would be obscured by heavy casualties

and limited gains during the division’s frustrating
second operational tour at the Somme in late
September and early October. Nevertheless, the
victory at Courcelette proved that the division
could successfully organize and execute a major
offensive operation. For Major-General Turner,
the battle stood as a personal vindication, and,
at least in his own mind, made up for past
failures.

The Battle of the Somme

W

hile the Canadians recovered from their
ordeal at Hooge and Mount Sorrel, the
British Fourth Army, under General Sir Henry
Rawlinson, assumed the lion’s share of the
greatest offensive yet launched by the British
Armies on the Western Front. This extended
series of operations, known collectively as the
Battle of the Somme, began on 1 July 1916 and
would continue through to 18 November, when
it finally bogged down in the autumn rain and
mud.
Based upon the experiences of 1915, many
British senior commanders, including the
commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig, believed that greater application of artillery
power was the key to breaking the deadlock on
the Western Front. After subjecting the German
lines north of the Somme River to prolonged
preliminary artillery bombardments, it was
hoped that the attacking British infantry would
be able to occupy the smoldering enemy positions
with minimal fighting. Unfortunately, the frontage
chosen for the offensive was too broad for the
available artillery resources. The bombardment
in support of the opening attack on 1 July was
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Training for the Somme

Major-General Richard Turner was the commander of
2nd Canadian Division. His generalship at the Battles
of 2nd Ypres and the St. Eloi Craters had called into
question his battlefield command abilities, but he was
to prove his critics wrong at Courcelette.

too dissipated to achieve the desired destructive
effect in most of the British sectors. As a result,
defending German forces inflicted a staggering
57,470 casualties on the British attackers. On the
other hand, French divisions, cooperating with
the British astride the Somme River, achieved
greater success on 1 July, in part owing to heavier
concentrations of artillery.2
In spite of Field Marshal Haig’s ambitions, no
breakthrough resulted during the first six weeks
of fighting.3 On 19 August, Haig announced his
intention “to deliver a strong attack about the
middle of September using ‘fresh forces and
all available resources.’”4 Although still licking
its wounds from Mount Sorrel, the Canadian
Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir
Julian Byng, was relatively fresh in comparison
with other formations. Consequently, its transfer
from Belgium to the Somme battlefront in France
began in late August.

O

n 28 August, the men of 2nd Canadian
Division commenced training for the
upcoming operations. The intensity and tempo
of the fighting at the Somme would be unlike
anything the Canadians had experienced.
Training would help somewhat in preparing
them, and the corps commander, LieutenantGeneral Byng, ensured that personal initiative
was fostered during infantry training exercises.
Casualties were simulated among the officers
and senior NCOs, forcing junior NCOs and even
private soldiers to assume leadership roles during
practice attacks. This cultivation of leadership
and personal initiative was an important feature
of Canadian training and tactical doctrine,
which would increasingly stress the importance
of devolving tactical command and control to
platoon and section leaders.5

Despite the value placed upon decentralization
during training, Canadian infantry tactics at the
Somme were not completely flexible. This had
less to do with the continuing use of successive
linear wave formations (which critics of British
infantry tactics at the Somme have often dwelled
upon) and more to do with the fact that the various
types of infantry weapons (rifles, bayonets, hand
grenades, rifle grenades, and Lewis guns) were
not effectively coordinated. Some of them,
such as the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun
(an automatic rifle), tended to be employed
in separate specialist sections organized and
often controlled by battalion headquarters. This
arrangement precluded efficient coordination
of a battalion’s full range of firepower assets
at platoon or section levels. Although many
Canadians, in common with others among the
Allied and German armies, already appreciated
the value of small unit tactics during the fighting
at the Somme, Canadian infantry platoons would
not become truly effective fire-units in their own
right until battalions were finally reorganized to
incorporate all of the major infantry weapons
within each platoon. This process would not
begin until the end of 1916.6
Meanwhile, Major-General Turner’s men
took advantage of what relatively little time
they had for training before they were thrust
into action at the Somme in September.7 Units
practiced on training grounds that were taped
off to represent enemy trenches. Manoeuvers
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were carried out on successive scales, first with
sections, then platoons and companies, followed
by entire battalions and brigades.8 These practice
attacks also introduced the men to the concept
of advancing behind an artillery barrage, which
on the training fields was “represented by men
carrying flags, who moved in bounds on timed
programmes to indicate the area on which the
shells would fall.” Many of these simulation
techniques had been used by British and
Canadian troops in their rehearsals for assaults
or trench raids before the Somme offensive.9

The Canadians Arrive at the Somme

O

n 30 August, the Canadian Corps began
relieving I Anzac Corps around Pozières,
and Lieutenant-General Byng assumed command
of the sector on 3 September.10 The Canadians
now joined General Sir Hubert Gough’s Reserve
Army, which had taken over the northern portion
of the Somme battlefront from General Sir Henry
Rawlinson’s Fourth Army on 3 July. While the 1st
Canadian Division held the entire corps front, the
2nd Canadian Division prepared for its part in
the upcoming attack, which would become known
as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette. This battle was
named for two villages which stood three miles

apart and lay between Thiepval to the west and
Morval to the east.11 The main thrust would be
delivered by three corps of Rawlinson’s Fourth
Army, whose objectives included the villages of
Flers and Morval. To protect Rawlinson’s left
flank, Gough’s Reserve Army would employ
the Canadian Corps to attack the area around
Courcelette and secure observation points over
the strong German defences known as the Third
Position. It was expected that the assault would
be aided by two particular innovations: the use of
a large-scale creeping artillery barrage, and the
employment of an entirely new type of weapon
– the tank.12
The Canadian Corps would advance with
two divisions along a 2,200-yard front. The 2nd
Canadian Division, occupying the right sector of
the Canadian front, would deliver the main attack
astride the Albert-Bapaume road. Major-General
Turner’s men would have to traverse a swathe
of German-held territory ranging in depth from
1,000 yards on the right to around 400 yards on
the left in order to gain their objectives south of
the village of Courcelette. These included Candy
Trench, the heavily fortified ruins of a sugar
factory, and roughly 1,500 yards of Sugar Trench.
Along the left sector, the 8th Infantry Brigade
of Major-General Louis Lipsett’s 3rd Canadian

Canadian War Museum EO-0771

Canadian soldiers test a Vickers machine gun prior to the Battle for Courcelette.
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Division would advance some 400 yards and
provide flank protection.13
On the night of 10 September, 2nd Canadian
Division entered the front lines, relieving two
brigades of 1st Canadian Division. The following
day, Turner submitted his division’s scheme of
operations to Canadian Corps headquarters.
Officers’ conferences were hastily convened to
discuss arrangements, and last minute practice
attacks were held.14 The task of planning had
not been easy, given the Canadians’ relative
inexperience in conducting large-scale offensive
operations, and the formidable nature of the
German positions. These consisted of a maze
of trenches and earthworks integrating existing
civilian structures, such as the Sugar Factory. This
edifice, along with many of the intact buildings
in Courcelette itself, was heavily fortified and
bristled with machine guns. In addition, the
village was honeycombed with cellars, dugouts,
and galleries furnishing ample protection for
large numbers of defending troops from the 45th
Reserve Division of the Guard Reserve Corps.15
According to the plan, 2nd Canadian Division
would attack on a two-brigade frontage, with
Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen’s 6th Brigade
on the left and Brigadier-General R. Rennie’s 4th

Brigade on the right.16 Ketchen assigned the 28th
Battalion to the left flank of his brigade’s advance,
while the 27th Battalion took the right flank. The
31st Battalion would be in support and the 29th
in brigade reserve. In the 4th Brigade, Rennie
directed the 21st, 20th, and 18th Battalions to
take up the left, center, and right sub-sections,
respectively, with the 19th Battalion in support.
In addition, the 24th Battalion was detached from
5th Brigade, which was in divisional reserve, and
temporarily placed under Rennie’s command for
use as brigade reserve.17
In support of 2nd Canadian Division’s infantry
would be an array of units and formations from
within and outside the Canadian Corps. These
included the 1st Canadian and 18th Divisional
Artilleries, with one field brigade from the
Lahore Divisional Artillery (for a total of 114 18pounders and 28 4.5-inch howitzers). The 3rd
Canadian Division had left its divisional artillery
in Flanders, as it was “still too green for battle.”
Consequently, it was supported by the four field
brigades of the 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery,
plus two brigades from the 48th Divisional
Artillery (in all, 72 18-pounders and 20 4.5inch howitzers). The artillery resources alone
were unprecedented in Canadian operations.
Supporting the two Canadian divisions were a
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total of 64 heavy and 234 field pieces.18 Additional
support would be rendered by the 1st Canadian
Motor Machine Gun Brigade, along with machine
guns from the 4th, 6th, and 9th Canadian
Machine Gun Companies.19
The attacking infantry battalions would
advance in successive waves following “the first
large-scale rolling barrage ever to be fired by
Canadian gunners.” At zero hour, the 18‑pounders
would open fire with shrapnel on a line 50 yards
short of the German front line trench. At zero
plus one minute, the barrage would lift to the
enemy front line trench and hold there for three
minutes. After that, the barrage would begin lifts
of 100 yards every three minutes until settling
upon the infantry’s final objective. There it would
stay for six minutes before moving on in three
more lifts of three minutes each to the final
barrage line between the villages of Courcelette
and Martinpuich – a total of 3,000 yards from the

infantry’s jumping-off trenches. At the same time,
the howitzers would unleash stationary barrages
upon the enemy’s rear areas.20
More novel and mobile fire support would
come from the recently organized tank companies.
In all, 49 operable tanks were available for the
British operations on 15 September, and virtually
all of them were allotted to the Fourth Army.
Only seven tanks (from No.1 Section, Heavy
Section, Machine Gun Corps) were assigned to
the Reserve Army, all of which were slated to
support 2nd Canadian Division. One of these
seven tanks would be kept in reserve, leaving six
to go into action – three tanks in support of each
attacking infantry brigade.21 The left detachment
of three tanks was ordered to proceed along 6th
Brigade’s left flank in order to furnish cover and
assist with mopping up. Once these tasks were
accomplished, these three tanks were to swing
east toward the rear of the Sugar Factory. The

Canadian War Museum 19820109-009

Brigadier-General H.D.B. Ketchen (seated), commander of 6th Brigade, with members of his staff.
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right detachment would advance along the AlbertBapaume Road and make straight for the Sugar
Factory, providing close support for 4th Brigade’s
infantry. When the infantry gained their final
objectives, the tanks would move back to their
assembly areas where they could be rearmed
and refueled.22
Although the employment of tanks was
the most innovative feature of the assault, the
operational scheme did not revolve around them.
Tanks were viewed mainly as adjuncts to the
infantry. According to the operational orders, the
tanks were to “conform to the infantry advance”
by having them accompany the first waves of
infantry. In fact, it was ordered that if the tanks
proved unable to keep up with the infantry, then
“the latter will not wait for them.”23 Moreover,
the Canadian infantry did not have time to
thoroughly train with the tanks that would be
supporting them. The first tanks were shipped
to France in mid-August, barely a month before
their battlefield debut, and it was not until early
September that a small training centre was set
up near Abbeville for the newly-formed tank
companies. This allowed tank crews little time
to practice skills other than basic driving and
gunnery. In short, before 15 September, there
had been too little time available for tanks and
infantry to train together.24 Yet the sheer novelty
of the technology presented potential advantages,
for even if the machines and tactics had yet to
be perfected, it was hoped that their shock value
might prove decisive.

The Battle of Courcelette

O

n the morning of 14 September, the day
before the attack, 2nd Canadian Division
issued Operation Order No.78. This order
outlined the final instructions for the advance,
proclaiming that, “The attack will be pushed with
the utmost vigour until the objective is reached
and every opportunity of exploiting success will
be seized.”25 In the hours before the assault,
jumping off trenches were dug in advance of
the Canadian front lines, which allowed the
troops to form up roughly 150 yards closer to
the German positions. In 6th Brigade’s section,
the German front line now lay between 100 and
200 yards away.26 Based on previous operations
at the Somme, it was felt that an attack should

consist of “a short rush of 200 to 300 yards at
most.” It was hoped that this would minimize
casualties and decrease the risk of the attackers
losing direction.27
However, this initial short rush would carry
the assaulting troops only to their first objective.
Before the 4th and 6th Brigades could settle down
to consolidate their gains, some battalions would
have to advance their first waves roughly 1,000
yards in order to reach their final objectives along
Sugar and Candy Trenches. Furthermore, the 5th
Brigade, in divisional reserve, was ordered to
prepare “to move forward to and beyond the final
objective,” if the opportunity arose, taking “every
opportunity of exploiting the success.”28 The
limited advances that had characterized British
attacks between late July and early September
were over. Field Marshal Haig now wanted a bold
rush, through to the German Third Position at
the outset of the September offensive. General
Gough, the commander of the Reserve Army,
and a cavalryman by training, was not favorably
disposed to caution and was anxious to fulfill
Haig’s vision.29
Many officers and other ranks remembered
that 15 September marked the first anniversary
of 2nd Canadian Division’s arrival in France. For
J.F. McKay of the 28th Battalion, the date also
had a more personal and ironic significance. “I
always remember that [date],” he said, “because
back in Saskatchewan…all my life I’d been getting
up early on the 15th of September to go out duck
shooting. This time I was going out for something
quite different. I was one of the ducks…”30
In the pre-dawn hours of 15 September, units
of the 4th and 6th Brigades moved into their
jumping-off positions.31 Periodic traffic jams in
the communication trenches were made worse
on the right portion of the 4th Brigade’s front
around 0300 hours, when the Germans launched
a sudden bombing attack supported by artillery.
Through the determined efforts of detachments
from the 18th, 19th, and 20th Battalions, the
enemy assault parties were soon repulsed.
Major-General Turner later remarked that if his
men had failed to check this fierce attack, “the
success of the whole planned advance might have
been jeopardized.”32 With the Canadian assembly
secured from this last minute threat, the leading
waves of infantry settled down to wait.

33
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Canadian War Museum EO-0740

LAC PA 551

Left: A heavy howitzer fires in support of the Canadians at Courcelette. Right: Canadian artillerymen unload howitzer
shells in anticipation of the upcoming battle, September 1916.

Over the previous three days, British and
Canadian heavy howitzers and siege guns
pounded enemy positions, softening them up for
the assault. Then at zero hour, 0620 hours, the
field guns,
standing almost wheel to wheel in the Sausage
and Mash Valleys joined in a tremendous
drum-fire that burst from the mile upon mile
of batteries of all calibres massed behind the
battlefront. The ground of No Man’s Land
trembled with the concussions and explosions
of the rolling barrage.33

Lance Cottermole of the 21st Battalion
recalled that he never heard the officer’s whistle
when the moment came to go over the top, for,
The air over our heads was suddenly filled with
the coughing and sighing, whining and screaming
of thousands of shells of all calibres, making it
impossible to hear anything. We stood up and I
looked around behind me; as far as the eye could
see, from left to right, there was a sheet of flame
from the hundreds of guns…belching fire and
smoke. It was an awe-inspiring sight.34

Amid the din, the men of 4th and 6th
Brigades clambered out of their jumping-off
trenches and lurched forward toward the enemy
front line, screened by a moving curtain of fire
and shrapnel. Most of the assaulting battalions
advanced in five waves, employing one, and
sometimes even two, intermediate waves
(supplied by the supporting battalions), which
served to mop up and consolidate the objectives.
In a mere seven minutes from zero hour, most
of the attackers from both brigades secured the
German front line. The 4th Brigade encountered
little opposition, but the 6th Brigade faced stiffer
resistance, particularly on its left, which was
overcome with bombs and bayonets.35
Brigadier-General Ketchen reported the
creeping barrage as “excellent,” with the “majority
of the enemy dead” being “shot through the head.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Elmer Jones of the 21st
Battalion concurred. According to Jones, the
artillery barrage “had thoroughly demolished”
the German front line trench “and killed most
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of the occupants.”36 Unusually large numbers
of dead and wounded Germans were found in
the front and support lines, confirming that
they had planned to follow up their pre-dawn
bombing attack on 4th Brigade’s front with a
full-scale assault. The waiting enemy troops,
crowded into their forward trenches, were caught
in the Canadian barrage and suffered huge
losses. Yet within three minutes of zero hour,
the German artillery laid down its own barrage,
which caused “considerable casualties” among
the Canadians. Although Allied counter battery
techniques continued to evolve throughout the
Somme campaign, they had not yet matured.
Consequently, enough enemy batteries survived
to inflict terrible damage upon the exposed
Canadian infantry each time they advanced.37
In spite of the enemy barrage, both Canadian
brigades moved onward through the German
second line. Some units experienced little fighting
and captured a number of dazed enemy survivors
who were glad to escape the ordeal of the
Allied bombardment. Other units encountered
stubborn pockets of resistance that poured a
galling enfilade fire into the attacking waves
before being dispatched by the grenades and
bayonets of the mopping-up parties.38

Trenches were taken, while the 6th Brigade
reported likewise 40 minutes later.39 As predicted,
the battle for the fortified Sugar Factory had been
deadly. In anticipation of stiff opposition at this
strong point, arrangements were made to bring
down a concentrated bombardment of heavy
artillery, which, according to Brigadier-General
Rennie, “assisted materially in checking the
enemy machine gun fire.” Employing the kind
of initiative that was drilled into them on the
training grounds, Rennie’s infantry assaulted
the factory from three sides simultaneously as
soon as the artillery bombardment lifted. At 6:55
a.m., troops of the 21st Battalion forced their
way into the Sugar Factory and captured around
125 survivors from its garrison.40 The attack
on the morning of 15 September may not have
exhibited the finesse in small unit tactics that the
Canadians would display in 1917 and 1918, but
the makings of them already were evident.
As the morning wore on, the mopping-up
parties continued their grim work, often lobbing
grenades down dugout shafts when their German
occupants refused to vacate. By afternoon, both
attacking brigades set many of their remaining
able-bodied men to work assisting engineer
and pioneer units in consolidating the captured

By 0700 hours the 4th Brigade reported
that its final objectives along Candy and Sugar
The artillery barrage which preceded the Canadian attack
on 15 September caught a large number of German
soldiers in their forward trenches as they prepared for an
attack of their own.

Canadian War Museum EO-0772
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The Capture of the Sugar Refinery at Courcelette by the Canadians on September 15, 1916 by Fortunio Matania

ground. Other troops formed offensive patrols
and pushed forward to establish advance posts
and strong points, relying heavily upon Lewis
gun teams. Positions were occupied just south
of Courcelette and along a sunken road (named
“Gun Pit Road”) linking Courcelette with the
neighboring village of Martinpuich. Around 0900
hours, members of the 31st Battalion managed to
work their way into the outskirts of Courcelette
itself, and sent word that the village was “fairly
clear of the enemy.”41
Even though it had not achieved complete
destruction, the supporting artillery had
destroyed or suppressed the German defenders
sufficiently that the Canadians were able to
maintain their forward momentum. BrigadierGeneral Rennie reported that prisoners taken
near the Sugar Factory declared that they were
completely surprised by the Canadian attack,
“and the Officers did not hesitate to express
their admiration for the irresistible advance of
our Infantry and their own helplessness in [the]
face of our bombardment.” Despite heavy losses,
especially among the first waves, many Canadian

junior officers and other ranks rose to the
occasion and took charge of those around them.
Rennie stated that although the 21st Battalion
had suffered heavy losses among its officers, most
of the companies carried on successfully under
the command of subalterns, while many platoons
continued to function under the leadership of
the NCOs, and, in some instances, of private
soldiers.42
But for many historians, it is the action
of the tanks on 15 September that remains a
principal point of interest, for such weapons had
never been used in combat before. The six tanks
supporting 2nd Canadian Division’s attack at
Courcelette had begun lumbering forward from
their assembly positions at zero hour. Yet all but
two soon were knocked out of action.43 Of the
two machines that did engage the enemy, some
anecdotal accounts have made great claims for
their impact. Gordon Scott of the 6th Brigade
Scout Section went over the top and soon was
forced to seek shelter in a shell hole, owing to
the “terrific machine gun fire” along the left flank.
Knowing that “it was sure death to expose one’s
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Some of the Germans fled but most of them
stood rooted to the spot on which they stood,
hands held high in surrender. We casually took
over the trench and then proceeded on down
the hill in the wake of our good friend. The tank
then moved across to the sugar factory, which
was resisting a very vigorous attack. Walls and
emplacements were pushed aside or mounted
and this redoubt was speedily reduced.44

A similar tale was told by Magnus MacIntyre
Hood of the 24th Battalion. Hood served in a
carrying party bringing up ammunition to the
21st Battalion, and he witnessed the arrival of
the single tank remaining in active support of the
4th Brigade. According to Hood, “As we reached
them [the 21st Battalion] we saw a Landship,
named the L.S. Crème de Menthe, pass ahead
and go right up to the walls of the [sugar] refinery,
Top right: Canadian soldiers stand beside a destroyed
tank on the Somme battlefield.
Centre right: A view of the Sugar Refinery after the battle
looking from the north. The telegraph poles mark the
position of the Albert-Baupaume road.
Right: Another view of the Sugar Refinery.

CWM EO-0927

CWM 19740155-044

It was at about this time that the first tank
appeared behind us, guided by a foot soldier who
miraculously escaped a rain of fire now diverted
from us toward the new arrival. In fact, all of
us rose from the holes and stood, unharmed,
watching in amazement. On it came, a dragon
spouting fire in all directions. The ground
was pitted with thousands of shell holes, but
the dragon dipped and rose and just came on
relentlessly until it stood astride the trench.

CWM EO-0929

head,” the situation appeared grim, until the only
operable tank supporting the 6th Brigade arrived
on the scene:

CWM 19750085-010 Destroyed Tank

Campbell: A Forgotten Victory

Below: This photo, taken from the Canadian start line,
shows the Sugar Refinery under an artillery bombardment
during the battle on 15 September 1916.
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Canadian War Museum 19940001-420 Sugar factory, south of Courcellette
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This air photo, taken on 15 September 1916, shows the shell-scarred battlefield surround the Sugar
Refinery (centre). The Albert-Bapaume road cuts across the bottom of the photo, Sugar Trench across
the top, while Candy Trench passes behind the Sugar Refinery to link the main road to Sugar Trench.
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its guns blazing. It seemed to lean against one of
the walls which collapsed and the monster tore
into the fort, while we could see the Germans
streaming out behind it offering an excellent
target to the riflemen in the shell holes.”45
These accounts make it appear as though
the two tanks were instrumental in the capture
of the Sugar Factory. However, according to
Brigadier-General Rennie’s after-action report,
the tank supporting his brigade arrived in the
vicinity of the Sugar Factory around 0750 hours
– almost a full hour after the 21st Battalion had
captured the factory. Nor did Lieutenant-Colonel
Elmer Jones of the 21st Battalion mention tank
support in his report on the capture of the Sugar
Factory. Instead, Jones ascribed the successful
storming of the factory to the accuracy of the
artillery bombardment and the “great vigor” of his
infantrymen. Both Jones and Rennie also noted
the valuable assistance rendered by the 27th
Battalion in silencing enemy machine gunners in
a trench situated half way between the jumpingoff line and the Sugar Factory.46

bogged down. They got caught in the old trenches,
you know, and they tipped over….they weren’t a
success.”48

we commenced our advance and made for the
Sugar Factory, which was my objective. Soon
after crossing our front line trench a group of
about 50 Germans came up towards the tank
to surrender. Our infantry was well in advance
of the tank, and were in the Sugar Factory by
the time I arrived; but I was able to make use of
my Hotchkiss Guns. I skirted the southern and
eastern side of the factory and went up to the
trench where our infantry were consolidating.
Having found an officer who informed me that
the position had been made good, I commenced
my return journey…47

Overall, the tanks played a limited part
in 2nd Canadian Division’s operations. They
assisted some troops who were pinned down,
such as Gordon Scott, by drawing enemy fire and
intimidating groups of Germans who were still
resisting. In the end, personal opinion of the tanks’
effectiveness depended upon one’s proximity to
either of the two machines that did advance, and
upon the circumstances that one was in at the
time. Many Germans that found themselves in
the tanks’ paths were suitably impressed, and
some were clearly terrified. Despite their slow
speed, the tanks could still inflict damage with
their guns. “Oh a lot got bogged down of course,”
said Sid Smith of the 18th Battalion, “but they
still had their fire power and…one thing they
did have was the matter of putting the wind up
the enemy…Heinies ran like hell when they saw
them coming.”49 Many accounts of the fighting at
Courcelette repeated the opinion of some German
prisoners that the use of tanks “was not war but
bloody butchery.”50

In reconciling Magnus MacIntyre Hood’s account
with such reports, it is worth remembering that
Hood’s duties in a carrying party would have
placed him on the scene at the Sugar Factory
much later than the men of the 21st Battalion.
Perhaps he misinterpreted some mopping-up
work by the tank as being the actual capture of
the factory. By way of contrast, it is worth noting
the opinion of one 21st Battalion veteran, who
argued that the tanks “were a fluke; they didn’t
amount to anything. They didn’t go very far…they

In a post-battle report to Lieutenant-General
Byng on the efficacy of the tanks, Major-General
Turner pronounced that “mopping up will,
in future, be the chief role of these engines.”
Byng was even more skeptical of their value,
declaring that, “No action of the infantry should
ever be made subservient to that of the tanks.
Tanks are a useful accessory to the infantry, but
nothing more.”51 While the tank experiment on
15 September did not result in a spectacular
success, lessons were learned that influenced

Even the tank crews themselves did not claim
that they played a key role in the capture of the
Sugar Factory. One of the tank officers, Captain
A.M. Inglis (commanding Tank No.721, C.5)
reported that at 0620 hours,

39
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007

13

Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4

This photo of Courcelette being shelled was taken from the northeast corner of the Sugar Refinery during the afternoon
of 15 September 1916 and shows the ground that had to be covered by the 22nd and 25th Battalions during their attack
on the village.

future technical and tactical developments. By
1917 and 1918, tanks would become an integral
part of Allied offensive strategy.52

Capturing the Village

N

otwithstanding the lackluster performance
of the tanks, 2nd Canadian Division had
done well for itself. But there was no time for
Major-General Turner to rest upon his newfound
laurels. With reports streaming in from Canadian
patrols regarding the relative disorganization of
remaining German defences, Lieutenant-General
Byng decided at 1110 hours that the situation
looked favorable enough to permit the capture
of Courcelette itself. After receiving assurances
that all infantry and artillery units would be ready
by early evening, Byng informed Turner at 1315
hours that zero hour for the next phase of the
advance would be at 1800 hours. Anticipating
this turn of events, Turner already had instructed
Brigadier-General A.H. Macdonell’s 5th Brigade,
then in divisional reserve, to begin preparing for
just such an endeavour.53
Throughout the morning, Macdonell had kept
his finger on the pulse of events, having situated
himself at divisional headquarters where he

relayed intelligence forward to his own brigade
headquarters. His staff and senior officers were
well apprised of the situation when, at Turner’s
behest, Macdonell hurriedly convened a meeting
of his four battalion commanders shortly after
1300 hours to plan the capture of Courcelette. The
22nd, 25th, and 26th Battalions were detailed to
make the assault, while the 24th Battalion, which
had functioned as the 4th Brigade’s reserve unit,
was again placed in this capacity upon reverting
to Macdonell’s command later that afternoon.
Flank protection on the left would be provided
by 3rd Canadian Division.54
There was time for the battalion commanders
and their officers to make only a quick visual
reconnaissance of the ground they would
have to cover, which was considerable. From
their starting point they would have to cross
approximately two miles in broad daylight before
reaching their objectives along the northern
and eastern outskirts of Courcelette.55 Time
did not permit the construction of jumping-off
trenches, nor did it allow for more methodical
planning. Brigadier-General Macdonell simply
explained to his battalion commanders the exact
dispositions for the attack and the duties of each
battalion.56
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It was decided that the battalions would form
up on the reverse side of a slight slope in order
to screen their movements from the enemy for
as long as possible. By 1700 hours, all units
were ready and began their advance. The 22nd
Battalion deployed on the right in three long
waves, and the 25th Battalion formed up on the
left in four waves. The 22nd Battalion would
maintain this formation during the attack, while
the 25th Battalion would reform into two longer
waves upon reaching the barrage line just before
zero hour. The 26th Battalion advanced 150
yards to the rear, with two companies deployed
in support of each of the two leading battalions.57
The troops moved off well before Byng’s stated
zero hour of 1800 hours because they had a
great deal of ground to cover before reaching the
forward positions of the 4th and 6th Brigades.
After moving through these positions, Macdonell’s
men would form up behind a creeping barrage,
scheduled to begin at zero hour, which would
precede them through Courcelette and lead them
to their objectives on the far side of the village.
Unfortunately, as soon as the 5th Brigade
began its march toward the new Canadian front
line, the Germans unleashed a creeping barrage
of their own, which dogged them mercilessly
throughout the entire advance.58 Amid the din
and confusion of the enemy barrage, battalion

scouts used compasses to help keep their
comrades on track, while officers trudged on
with maps in hand, carefully noting surviving
landmarks. All ranks observed the position of
the sun, which was over their left shoulders, and
used it as a general guide along their northerly
march route. Eventually, they passed through the
foremost Canadian positions and reached their
own barrage line in time for zero hour. The first
lift was scheduled for 1815 hours giving all ranks
a much-needed, albeit brief, rest before the final
push into Courcelette. Units were halted as close
to the barrage as possible, and officers used the
few minutes remaining to reform their men.59
When the barrage began rolling forward, the
three battalions resumed their advance, with the
central street running north through the center
of Courcelette forming the boundary between the
22nd and 25th Battalions. As they proceeded
through the blasted remains of the village, they
at last came to grips with German troops from
the 210th and 211th Reserve Regiments of the
45th Reserve Division. The fighting was swift
and brutal. The 22nd Battalion managed to push
through to its objective by 1845 hours, following
“a sharp fight of ten minutes during which the
bayonet was frequently used.” To the left of
the French Canadians, the Nova Scotians and
other Maritimers in the 25th Battalion reached

A Canadian staff officer examines a smashed German field gun captured in Courcelette.
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The aftermath of the battle:– (from the top down)
The bodies of Canadian solidiers killed during the initial
attack lay in no-man’s-land in front of Canadian lines.
Wounded Canadian soldiers are taken care of my medical
personnel in a forward trench.
German soldiers received medical attention before being
sent behind the lines into captivity.
The war is over for this group of German soldiers captured
during the fighting for Courcelette.

CWM EO-0756

their objective even earlier, at 1825 hours after
crossing bayonets with the Germans in a deadly
five-minute struggle.60
However, not every member of the enemy
garrison was so aggressive in defence. Gordon
Silliker of “D” Company, 25th Battalion, was not
impressed with the martial spirit of the German
troops that he encountered as he fought his way
through Courcelette:
We went into the village with one big rush which
frightened all the Huns to death – the ones the
artillery left. They nearly all surrendered, most
of them meeting us with their hands up calling
‘Mercy Kamerade’…Our company got about a
hundred officers and men.
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There is not much fight in the Germans. They
are all right if they can get in some safe place
where you cannot see them and they can snipe at
you or put a machine gun on you…It’s a different
tune they have when you get them on the point
of the bayonet and especially when they get
up against a Canadian. Whenever they see the
Canadians coming they as a rule meet them with
their hands up.61

Bayonet work was prominent in both the
morning and evening attacks at Courcelette.
Musketry was employed frequently as well,62
especially against groups of fleeing Germans.
The 5th Brigade reported that upon entering
Courcelette, “our troops saw many Bosches
‘scuppering’ away over the ridge, many of whom
were killed by our deliberate rifle fire and in
some cases, sections had a splendid opportunity
of making effective use of section fire control, the
whole section coming into action as a fire unit
on the fleeing enemy.”63 Although the habits of
trench warfare led troops on both sides to favor
grenades over rifles and bayonets, the Canadians’
use of musketry at Courcelette displayed
their willingness to utilize rifles as weapons of
opportunity.

16

Campbell: A Forgotten Victory

While the 22nd and 25th Battalions made good
their new positions 300 yards to the north and
northeast of Courcelette, the 26th Battalion began
mopping up the village. Although the artillery had
obliterated many of the buildings, there still were
plenty of dugouts and cellars in which German
troops could hold out. These had to be cleared
one by one, and this arduous task took the best
part of two days to complete. Mopping-up and
securing prisoners were important tasks, for
it was said that unguarded German stragglers
sometimes picked up weapons and fired into the
backs of the troops who had initially accepted
their surrender. 64 The Germans reportedly
employed other ruses as well. For instance,
during the morning attack on 15 September,
a party of Germans approached Captain B.M.
Loghrin of the 18th Battalion with the apparent
intention of surrendering. When Loghrin stepped
forward to accept their surrender, one of the
Germans hurled a grenade that killed the Captain
instantly. According to Brigadier-General Rennie,
“This foul act of treachery was observed by the
men of his Company, with the result that none
of the occupants of the trench were allowed to
escape alive.”65
In some instances the Canadian troops were
not angels either. Through a mixture of motives,
including revenge, fears of German treachery, and
possible official encouragement, some Canadians
refused to take prisoners on 15 September. Many
men in 2nd Canadian Division saw the attack
as a chance to settle old scores with “Fritz” for
the punishments inflicted upon them at St. Eloi,
Hooge, and in other smaller deadly encounters.
According to Brigadier-General Ketchen, “An
officer of the 3rd Canadian Division, who was
watching our advance from his position on our
left, stated that the bayonet work of our Battalions
was really magnificent. No wonder; these men
had been cooped up in the Ypres Salient for
many months and were getting a little of their
own back.”66 When one member of the 28th
Battalion was questioned about the scarcity of
prisoners taken by his unit, he spat back the
reply, “We’re not taking any. They blew mines
under us twice.”67 Many troops in the 4th Brigade
were equally uncharitable. “On our advancing,”
Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Jones admitted, “some of
the enemy offered to surrender but in most cases
these men were bayonetted by our advancing
troops.”68 Major-General Turner was well aware

of the pent-up hostility in his division, admitting
in his diary that, “The men were not looking for
prisoners, and considered a dead German was
the best.”69
There is some suggestion that it may have
been official policy to take few prisoners on 15
September, and that this policy resulted directly
from fears of German deceit. Lance Cottermole
of the 21st Battalion claimed that he and his
comrades,
were given strict instructions to take NO
prisoners until our objectives had been gained.
The reason for this was that so often in British
advances, when the Germans had thrown down
their arms in surrender and our men had moved
through them, at the same time indicating to
them to go to our rear where they would be
collected as prisoners, the Germans had picked
up their rifles again and shot our men in the
back, thereby bringing the advance to a halt.
No such risks could or would be taken in this
important attack, and orders were reluctantly
carried out.70

During the battle, as Cottermole and his
comrades in the battalion’s third wave busied
themselves mopping up some enemy positions,
he observed,
One young German, scruffy, bareheaded, cropped
hair, and wearing steel-rimmed spectacles, [who]
ran, screaming with fear, dodging in and out
amongst us to avoid being shot, crying out ‘Nein!
Nein!’ He pulled out from his breast pocket
a handful of photographs and tried to show
them to us (I suppose they were of his wife and
children) in an effort to gain our sympathy. It
was all of no avail. As the bullets smacked into
him he fell to the ground motionless, the pathetic
little photographs fluttering down to the earth
around him.71

So far, evidence of instructions to take no
prisoners has not been found in official orders.
But the exhortation in the divisional operation
orders on 14 September to push the attack
“with the utmost vigour until the objective is
reached,” may have provided some subordinate
commanders with justification for encouraging,
or even ordering, their men to act ruthlessly.
Nevertheless, 2nd Canadian Division did
collect significant numbers of German prisoners
between 15 and 17 September. BrigadierGeneral Macdonell reported approximately
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1,055 prisoners captured by 5th Brigade, and
Brigadier-General Ketchen reported that 6th
Brigade took around 350 prisoners. BrigadierGeneral Rennie did not supply an exact figure, but
4th Brigade’s captures likely were comparable to
6th Brigade’s.72 Prisoners were sent to brigade
headquarters, and parties of Canadian Corps
Cyclists escorted them farther back to the Corps
Cage in Albert.73
By 1935 hours on 15 September, MajorGeneral Turner received confirmation through
verbal reports and aerial contact patrols74 that the
“whole of Courcelette had been taken.” At 1950
hours he sent “his heartiest congratulations” to
all ranks for the day’s accomplishments.75 The
division also received accolades from General
Gough and Field Marshal Haig. Gough was
especially impressed with the 5th Brigade’s
performance, pointing out that their attack
“across the open without any jumping-off place
in the nature of trenches is without parallel in the
history of the present campaign.” He requested
that Brigadier-General Macdonell submit a report
on the brigade’s advance, including details on the
formations employed by his battalions.76
Haig also was quite pleased with the day’s
achievements. “The result of the fighting of
the 15th of September and following days,”
he enthusiastically declared, “was a gain more
considerable than any which had attended our
arms in the course of a single operation since the
commencement of the offensive.”77 In his personal
diary he noted also that, “The two Canadian
[Brigades] which took the Sugar Factory and
joining trenches were those which were said to
have failed at St.Eloi in the spring. Sent a word
of thanks and congratulation to them.”78
This shows that Haig had not forgotten the
debacle at St. Eloi, and Turner and his brigadiers
must have been acutely aware of the scrutiny they
were under. The effect this had on the behavior
of numerous senior officers was readily apparent
to subordinates like Captain Andrew Macphail,
who observed that, “many officers commanding
are like children at school. They wish to avoid a
‘black mark’ or a ‘rap over the knuckles’; these
are their favourite words.”79
At last the spectre of failure at St. Eloi
departed from Turner and 2nd Canadian
Division, and the “black mark” that had lain

upon their reputations was largely, if not totally,
erased. They had proved to their superiors, to
their peers in other formations, and to the enemy
that they were capable of planning and executing
a successful large-scale offensive operation. In his
personal diary on 17 September, Turner revealed
his deep personal satisfaction. “We have had a
great success,” he concluded,
the greatest of any Division since these operations
started…For 12 months I have waited with the
Division for this opportunity. God knows they
acted in a magnificent way – nothing, “losses” or
anything else could stop them – they were out to
even old scores of the Ypres Salient. From the
Commander-in-Chief down – all are pleased.”80

As the days passed, Turner grew even bolder
in trumpeting the achievements of his division, as
shown by a letter that he sent to Sir Max Aitken,
complete with laudatory newspaper clippings
about the success at Courcelette. “The attached
clippings,” Turner advised Aitken, “have further
reference to the success of this division.” 81
Turner’s emphasis of the word this in his letter
reveals how sensitive he was about his division’s
reputation – a reputation that, by extension,
reflected upon his own. He also refused to share
much credit for the capture of Courcelette with
the British tanks that had supported his infantry
and garnered a great deal of publicity, despite
their limited role. On 22 September, he declared
that, “Too much credit must not be placed on the
tanks yet – Courcelette was won by my infantry.”82
Turner was correct in downplaying the role of
the tanks, but he did insufficient justice to the
artillery’s role. Without overwhelming artillery
support, his infantry would have sustained
heavier losses than they did, and would not have
captured their objectives as quickly as they did
– if they captured them at all.
Even with heavy artillery support, the
operation still cost 2nd Canadian Division dearly.
In taking Courcelette, its infantry battalions
suffered 1,283 casualties (79 officers and 1,204
other ranks) on 15 September alone. Of these,
36 officers and 678 other ranks were killed.83
The carnage of the fighting and the heavy losses
on both sides left many men shaken. LieutenantColonel T.L. Tremblay of the 22nd Battalion
remarked that, “If hell is as bad as what I have
seen at Courcelette, I would not wish my worst
enemy to go there.”84 Yet discipline in the division’s
units remained substantially intact in the weeks
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Canadian troops return victorious from the Battle of Courcelette.

immediately following the village’s capture.
On 1 October, the divisional Assistant Provost
Marshal, Major A.M. Jarvis, declared that, “the
general standard of conduct and discipline was
never higher. The men though lively and sober
are exceptionally well behaved and are bearing
unusual hardships and fatigue with marvelous
spirit. To lead such men is a glory – an honour
without price.”85
If 2nd Canadian Division’s time at the Somme
was limited to its hard-fought victory on 15
September, then the division’s experience in this
campaign, although costly in terms of lives, might
have had a more positive and lasting impact on
the formation’s collective self-image. Certainly,
personnel at all levels, from Major-General
Turner and his staff down to the ordinary rank
and file, had proved their capacity to mount a
successful attack on a divisional scale.
However, the fighting that continued during
the rest of September and early October quickly
sapped whatever positive energy Turner and
his men derived from their initial advance.
2nd Canadian Division managed to beat off
heavy German counterattacks at Courcelette,
and although it performed no worse than other
divisions during successive operations at Thiepval
Ridge and the Ancre Heights, it was too worn out
to capture such formidable objectives as Regina

Trench. By the time it departed the Somme on 10
October, 2nd Canadian Division would suffer a
total of 6,817 casualties (286 officers and 6,531
other ranks) in two bloody tours of duty.86 The
capture of Courcelette was overshadowed by less
conclusive subsequent battles, and by the overall
dismal reputation that the Somme campaign
gained. As a result, the battle remains largely
forgotten in popular memory. Yet, when viewed
in hindsight, the operation is an impressive
achievement despite its horrors, and serves as
a harbinger of greater victories to come in 1917
and 1918.
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